According to Finite Fine-grainedness (roughly), there is a finite sequence of intuitively small differences between any two welfare levels. The assumption of Finite Fine-grainedness is essential to Gustaf Arrhenius’s favored sixth impossibility theorem in population axiology and plays an important role in the spectrum argument for the (Negative) Repugnant Conclusion. I argue that Theravāda Buddhists will deny Finite Fine-grainedness and consider the space that doing so opens up—and fails to open up—in population axiology. I conclude with a lesson for population axiology that generalizes beyond the Buddhist context: to plausibly deny Finite Fine-grainedness, we must locate a welfare good—such as the good of awakening (bodhi)—with some rather esoteric axiological properties.
目次
Abstract 1 Introduction 2 Against Finite Fine-grainedness 5 Finite Fine-grainedness and the Repugnant Conclusion 14 The Repugnant Conclusion Strikes Back? 16 Aversion and the Negative Repugnant Conclusion 19 Conclusion 22 Acknowledgements 24 Works Cited 24
