The author of the monograph Meta-Ethics in Buddhism Ven. Shih Chao-hwei sensibly indicates two approaches in meta-ethics: a linguistic one and a metaphysical one. She introduces contemporary meta-ethical theories with great clarity and examines the arguments among these theories. She also discusses issues generated from them. Finally Ven. Chao-hwei brings about the Buddhist standpoint concerning core issues such as cognitive vs. non-cognitive meaning of moral words, taking the Buddhist view of “no essence” for every existence as the presupposition. For the metaphysical approach, Ven. Chao-hwei proposes the concept of “self-other transference” as a key to resolve the problem of inference from is to ought and to establish the possibility of altruism from the Buddhist philosophy.
In this paper, I attempt to briefly review Ven. Chao-hwei’s arguments with special reference to R.M. Hare’s prescriptivist views on moral language, linguistic intuition and the reasons for objecting one of its main opponents, i.e. descriptivism. I further discuss the level of above-mentioned Buddhist presupposition where it applies. As for the ground of altruism, I examine the proposed concept of “self-other transference” to see if it can avoid the accusation of “from is to ought” fallacy.
