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| In Search of Buddhist Virtue: A Case for a Pluralist-Gradualist Moral Philosophy | ||
| 作者 | Hanner, Oren (著) |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Comparative Philosophy |
| 卷期 | v.12 n.2 |
| 出版日期 | 2021.07 |
| 頁次 | 58 - 78 |
| 出版者 | The Center for Comparative Philosophy & University Library |
| 出版地 | California, US [加利福尼亞州, 美國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 附註項 | HANNER, OREN: Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Comparative Religion, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, and Research Fellow, Numata Center for Buddhist Studies, Hamburg University, Germany. |
| 關鍵詞 | Aristotle; Buddhaghosa; Buddhist ethics; Eudaimonia; Virtue ethics; Visuddhimagg |
| 摘要 | Classical presentations of the Buddhist path prescribe the cultivation of various good qualities that are necessary for spiritual progress, from mindfulness (sati) and loving-kindness (metta) to faith (saddhā) and wisdom (paññā). Examining the way in which such qualities are described and classified in early Buddhism—with special reference to their treatment in the Visuddhimagga (Path of Purification) by the fifth-century Buddhist thinker Buddhaghosa—the present article employs a comparative method in order to identify the Buddhist catalog of virtues. The first part sketches the characteristics of virtue as analyzed by neo-Aristotelian theories. Relying on these accounts, the second part considers three lists from early Buddhism as possible catalogs of virtue: (1) the components of ethical conduct (sīla), (2) the 37 factors that contribute to awakening (bodhipakkhiyā dhammā), and (3) the wholesome (kusala) or beautiful (sobhana) mental factors (cetasika). I then raise the question of why the Buddhist tradition developed several classifications of virtue, whereas the Western tradition of virtue ethics used a single category. Appealing to the connection between the virtues and living well (eudaimonia) in the eudaimonistic version of virtue ethics, I propose that one of the reasons why Buddhism developed multiple lists of virtues is its pluralistic acceptance of different modalities of living well and associated practices, in MacIntyre’s sense of the term. These modalities and practices are not equal, but are ordered hierarchically. Accordingly, I conclude that Buddhist ethics ought to be seen as a pluralist-gradualist system rather than a universalist theory. |
| 目次 | Abstract 58 1. Neo-aristotelian Anatomies of Virtue 60 2. Buddhist Catalogs of Virtues 66 3. From Buddhist Virtues to Pluralism and Gradualism 73 Acknowledgments 76 References 76 |
| ISSN | 21516014 (E) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2021).120206 |
| 點閱次數 | 190 |
| 建檔日期 | 2023.09.20 |
| 更新日期 | 2023.09.20 |
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