My critical focus in this article is on Rick Repetti's compatibilist conception of free will, and his apparent commitment to a Kantian conception of autonomy, which I argue is in direct conflict with the Buddhist doctrine of no-self. As an alternative, I defend a conception of ego-less agency that I believe better coheres with core Buddhist teachings. In the course of the argument, I discuss the competing conceptions of free agency and autonomy defended by Harry Frankfurt, John Martin Fischer, Christine Korsgaard, and David Velleman.
目次
Abstract 497 Frankfurt On Meta-Volitional Control and Fischer on Reason-Responsiveness 499 Agency, Dependent Origination, And No-Self 502 Source Autonomy and Kantian Autonomy of The Will 505 Korsgaard On Practical Identities and Self-Constitution 507 Velleman's “Buddhist” Critique of Frankfurt's Contingent but Essential Self 510 Primal Confusion, Buddhist Perfections, and Ego-Less Agency 512 Conclusion 515 Acknowledgements 516 Notes 516 References 517
