 |
|
| Some Remarks on the Apparent Absence of a priori Reasoning in Indian Philosophy | ||
| 作者 | Taber, John (著) |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Journal of Indian Philosophy |
| 卷期 | v.50 n.5 |
| 出版日期 | 2022.11 |
| 頁次 | 785 - 801 |
| 出版者 | Springer |
| 出版者網址 | http://www.springer.com/gp/ |
| 出版地 | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 附註項 | John Taber, Department of Philosophy MSC 03 2140, 1 University of New Mexico, 87131-0001, Albuquerque, NM, United States. |
| 關鍵詞 | Indian epistemology; Empiricism; A priori knowledge; Reason; Kumārila; Plato |
| 摘要 | This essays considers the hypothesis that Indian epistemology does not clearly recognize, let alone emphasize, an intellectual faculty that apprehends intelligible things, such as essences or “truths of reason,” or elevate knowledge of such things to a status higher than that of sense perception. Evidence for this hypothesis from various sources, including Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, and Buddhist logic-epistemological writings, is examined. Special attention is given to a passage from Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika, Pratyakṣasūtra chapter, where he argues that the senses directly perceive existence. Kumārila’s view is contrasted to Plato’s, in the Theaetetus, that existence is the object, not of the senses, but the soul (psychē). |
| 目次 | Abstract 785 References 800 |
| ISSN | 00221791 (P); 15730395 (E) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-022-09523-3 |
| 點閱次數 | 189 |
| 建檔日期 | 2023.06.30 |
| 更新日期 | 2023.11.03 |
建議您使用 Chrome, Firefox, Safari(Mac) 瀏覽器能獲得較好的檢索效果，IE不支援本檢索系統。
