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| Buddhist Ethics Is Itself and Not Another Thing | ||
| 作者 | Schultz, Aaron (著) |
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| 出版日期 | 2015.04.22 |
| 頁次 | 76 |
| 出版者 | Kent State University |
| 出版者網址 | https://www.kent.edu/ |
| 出版地 | Kent, OH, US [肯特, 俄亥俄州, 美國] |
| 資料類型 | 博碩士論文=Thesis and Dissertation |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 學位類別 | 碩士 |
| 校院名稱 | Kent State University |
| 系所名稱 | Philosophy |
| 指導教授 | David Pereplyotchik |
| 關鍵詞 | Buddhist Ethics; Eightfold Path; Consequentialism; Virtue Ethics |
| 摘要 | In recent scholarship, an ongoing debate about Buddhist ethics has been taking place. On one side, some adhere to the position that Buddhist ethics resembles consequentialism. One noteworthy figure, Charles Goodman, has written on this subject at length in a book titled The Consequences of Compassion. Others hold that Buddhist ethics is akin to Aristotelean virtue ethics. Damien Keown is a key proponent of this view, which he argues in a work titled The Nature of Buddhist Ethics. Both of these views attempt to offer the best interpretation of Buddhist ethics so that it can better understood and analyzed. In the pages that follow, I will argue for two claims: First, both Goodman and Keown make crucial errors in their methodology by failing to lay out the best set of necessary conditions for virtue ethics and consequentialism. I aim to shed light on this methodological error and to offer a basis of comparison that is more precise. Having recalibrated the starting point of this debate by setting out the necessary conditions virtue ethics and consequentialism, I develop my second main claim—viz., that a third, distinct approach to interpreting Buddhist ethics is available. |
| 點閱次數 | 478 |
| 建檔日期 | 2023.03.27 |
| 更新日期 | 2023.03.27 |
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