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| Four Mīmāṃsā Views Concerning the Self’s Perception of Itself | ||
| 作者 | Watson, Alex (著) |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Journal of Indian Philosophy |
| 卷期 | v.48 n.5 |
| 出版日期 | 2020.11 |
| 頁次 | 889 - 914 |
| 出版者 | Springer |
| 出版者網址 | http://www.springer.com/gp/ |
| 出版地 | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 關鍵詞 | Mı¯ma¯m: sa¯; Bhat˙ t ˙ a Jayanta; Nyāyamañjarī; Self-perception; Self-awareness; Kuma¯rila |
| 摘要 | The article concerns a mediaeval Indian debate over whether, and if so how, we can know that a self (ātman) exists, understood here as a subject of cognition (jñātṛ) that outlives individual cognitions, being their common substrate. A passage that has not yet been translated from Sanskrit into a European language, from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamañjarī (c. 890 CE), ‘Blossoms of Reasoning’, is examined. This rich passage reveals something not yet noted in secondary literature, namely that Mīmāṃsakas advanced four different models of what happens when the self perceives itself. The article clarifies the differences between the four, and the historical and logical relationships between them. It also hypothesizes pressures that constituted the need for the creation of the newer views, i.e. perceived problems with the earlier views, which the proponents of the newer views saw themselves as overcoming. |
| 目次 | Abstract Introduction View 1: The Vṛttikāra Objection to View 1 View 2: Kumārila Objection to View 2 View 3: Umbeka Excursus on Jayanta’s Own View The Dialectic up to This Point The Dialectic in the Ślokavārttika and Its Commentaries View 4: Prabhākara Conclusion References |
| ISSN | 00221791 (P); 15730395 (E) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10781-020-09446-x |
| 點閱次數 | 131 |
| 建檔日期 | 2022.12.29 |
| 更新日期 | 2022.12.29 |
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