 |
|
| The Concept of Manas in Jaina Philosophy | ||
| 作者 | Soni, Jayandra (著) |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Journal of Indian Philosophy |
| 卷期 | v.48 n.2 |
| 出版日期 | 2020.04 |
| 頁次 | 315 - 328 |
| 出版者 | Springer |
| 出版者網址 | http://www.springer.com/gp/ |
| 出版地 | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 關鍵詞 | manas; Jaina epistemology; Uma¯sva¯ti’s Tattvārtha-sūtra; mati; manaḥ-paryāya; śruta; Sa¯n˙khya |
| 摘要 | The first time Umāsvāti uses the word manas in his Tattvārtha-sūtra (TAS), the standard work for matters concerning Jaina philosophy, is when he lists the means of knowledge: mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥ-paryāya and kevala (TAS 1, 9). These are the pramāṇas (TAS 1, 10). In TAS 1, 14 mati or sense perception is said to be caused by indriya and aninindriya; Pūjyapāda’s commentary says that anindriya, antaḥ-karaṇa and manas are synonyms. This obviously raises questions about the specific role and function of the manas/anindriya in mati, manaḥ-paryāya and śruta, and how these retain their exclusivity without reducing the function of any of them to another means of cognition. In the Sāṅkhya system manas is seen as both an organ of cognition (buddhīndriya) and an organ of action (karmendriya, SK 27). It is interesting for a better understanding of the role of manas in Jaina thought to compare some aspects of it with the Sāṅkhya system. |
| 目次 | Abstract Mati-jñāna Śruta-jñāna Manaḥ-paryaya-jñāna Conclusion Abbreviations and Literature |
| ISSN | 00221791 (P); 15730395 (E) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10781-020-09421-6 |
| 點閱次數 | 183 |
| 建檔日期 | 2022.12.29 |
| 更新日期 | 2022.12.29 |
建議您使用 Chrome, Firefox, Safari(Mac) 瀏覽器能獲得較好的檢索效果，IE不支援本檢索系統。
