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| The concept of svasaṃvedana in Dignāga and Candrakīrti | ||
| 作者 | Nurboo, Tsering (著) |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East |
| 卷期 | v.32 n.4 |
| 出版日期 | 2022 |
| 頁次 | 448 - 465 |
| 出版者 | Routledge |
| 出版者網址 | https://www.routledge.com/ |
| 出版地 | Abingdon, UK [阿賓登, 英國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 關鍵詞 | Dignāga (c. 480–540 AD); Candrakīrti (c. 600–650 AD); svasaṃvedana=reflexive awareness; Padma dkar po (1527-1592) |
| 摘要 | The concept of reflexive awareness (Sanskrit svasaṃvedana or svasaṃvitti, Tibetan rang rig) is considered an important epistemological notion in the Dignāga tradition of Buddhist pramāṇa theory. The traditionally accepted view is that Dignāga advocates Yogācāra’s notion of reflexive awareness in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and Candrakīrti rejects it altogether. By contrast, the present paper revisits Dignāga and Candrakīrti in the context of svasaṃvedana and argues that Dignāga endorses the antarjñeyavādic notion of svasaṃvedana and Candrakīrti does not negate it at the conventional level. Candrakīrti attacks Dignāga by attributing him as an exponent of Sautrāntrika-Yogācāra notion of reflexive awareness, but his critique does not fundamentally affect Dignāga’s notion of reflexive awareness propounded in the Pramāṇasamuccaya. The submission of the paper is that the fundamental epistemic agenda of reflexive awareness in Dignāga and Candrakīrti is identical, though they diverge methodologically, and it is shown by reexamining Padma dkar po’s interpretation. |
| ISSN | 09552367 (P); 14692961 (E) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2022.2119674 |
| 點閱次數 | 133 |
| 建檔日期 | 2022.12.28 |
| 更新日期 | 2022.12.28 |
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