Sāṃkhya; Indian epistemology; means of knowledge (pramāṇa); pramāṇa-vyavasthā; pramāṇa-samplava
摘要
One of the lively polemics between Buddhists and Naiyāyikas is devoted to the question of whether each pramāṇa—means of knowledge—has an independent scope of validity, which does not overlap the scopes of other pramāṇas, or whether more than one pramāṇa can be applied to the same object. Dignāga and continuators of his thought defend pramāṇa-vyavasthā, ‘autonomy of [the object spheres of] pramāṇas,’ while Naiyāyikas defend the opposing conception, called pramāṇa-samplava, ‘coalescence of [the object spheres of] pramāṇas.’ Scholars usually ascribe pramāṇa-vyavasthā to Sāṃkhya. This paper explores the classical and postclassical Sāṃkhya view of the scope of the pramāṇas and shows that Sāṃkhya did not follow pramāṇa-vyavasthā. In Sāṃkhya, the scopes of perception and inference for knowing perceptible objects overlap, while inference for knowing supersensible objects and reliable verbal testimony have autonomous object spheres. However, there is also a tendency toward pramāṇa-vyavasthā in Sāṃkhya, which is in conflict with the Sāṃkhya theory of pramāṇas.
