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| Reasons and doubt in Dharmottara and his critics | ||
| 作者 | Nowakowski, David (著) |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East |
| 卷期 | v.27 n.4 |
| 出版日期 | 2017 |
| 頁次 | 340 - 368 |
| 出版者 | Routledge |
| 出版者網址 | https://www.routledge.com/ |
| 出版地 | Abingdon, UK [阿賓登, 英國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 關鍵詞 | Dharmottara; inference; doubt; hetvābhāsa; Buddhist epistemology |
| 摘要 | This paper examines the role of doubt in the classification of inferential reasons in Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭīkā, and in the works of his Nyāya rivals Keśavamiśra and Jayantabhaṭṭa. As deeply systematic thinkers, larger themes in these philosophers’ metaphysics directly determine the more local issues in epistemology and inferential theory, helping to explain, and show the significance of, the differences in their accounts of inferential reasons. For Keśava, an ontology which includes real universals allows for an externalist, reliabilist epistemology, on which the conditions for a genuine inferential reason can be stated in an absolute (as opposed to cogniser-relative) manner. For Dharmottara, on the other hand, an ontology in which mentally constructed universals are imposed upon real particulars leads to greater dependency on the cognising agent, such that the triple conditions for the inferential reason are formulated in a cogniser-relative way. These differences lead to a more restrictive list of acceptable reasons on Dharmottara’s part, which excludes cases involving doubt. |
| ISSN | 09552367 (P); 14692961 (E) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2017.1396652 |
| 點閱次數 | 131 |
| 建檔日期 | 2022.12.26 |
| 更新日期 | 2022.12.26 |
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