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| 『大乗広百論釈論』における常住性批判=Dharmapāla’s Critique of Eternalism in the First Chapter of the Dasheng guangbailun shilun | ||
| 作者 | 渡辺俊和 (著)=Watanabe, Toshikazu (au.) |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | 印度學佛教學研究 =Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies=Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū |
| 卷期 | v.69 n.2 (總號=n.153) |
| 出版日期 | 2021.03.25 |
| 頁次 | 885 - 879 |
| 出版者 | 日本印度学仏教学会 |
| 出版者網址 | http://www.jaibs.jp/ |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 日文=Japanese |
| 關鍵詞 | ダルマパーラ; 大乗広百論釈論; チャンドラキールティ; ディグナーガ; ダルマキールティ; dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana; vyavacchedamātra |
| 摘要 | This paper examines Dharmapāla’s critique of eternalism found in the first chapter of his Dasheng guangbailun shilun 大乗広百論釈論, and clarifies the following points: 1. It is reasonable to think that the “logician” (tārkika, rtog ge ba) that Candrakīrti refers to and criticizes in the 9th chapter of his Catuḥśatakaṭīkā is Dharmapāla. 2. Three types of logical reason given by Dharmapāla in his commentary on Catuḥśataka 9.4 are similar to the three types of property referred to by Dharmakīrti. 3. Since the logical reason “not being a product” is a property formed by mere exclusion (vyavacchedamātra), its being a property of the subject of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva) is ensured even with regard to the subject whose existence Buddhists do not accept (e.g. space etc.), and is classified as a contraditory (viruddha) called dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana. These results show that Dharmapāla plays a bridging role in the developments in Buddhist logic from Dignāga to Dharmakīrti and his commentators. Further examination of Dharmapāla’s theory will make it possible for us to reconsider the innovations in Dharmakīrti’s theory. |
| 目次 | 1.はじめに 885 2.tārkika,ダルマパーラ 885 3.dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana について 883 4.おわりに 881 |
| ISSN | 00194344 (P) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.4259/ibk.69.2_885 |
| 點閱次數 | 376 |
| 建檔日期 | 2022.11.25 |
| 更新日期 | 2022.11.25 |
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