There is an established theory of Śrīlāta’s idea of the process of perception, which was interpreted by Kato Junsho 加藤純章 (1989) as, “The sense organ and the object-field are in the first moment; then perceptual consciousness arises in the second moment; after that, feelings→concepts→volition will arise gradually in the third and subsequent moments.” Śrīlāta approved the existence of feelings, concepts, and volition’s mental functions. Conversely, the Dārṣṭāntika and Harivarman denied it. Based on the difference between the two, Kato indicated that in terms of mind and mental functions which are arising gradually one by one, Śrīlāta had the same idea. If this is so, can Śrīlāta’s theory of the process of perception really be as stated? The theories of the process of perception of the Dārṣṭāntika and Sautrāntika cannot be lumped together. In order to reconsider Śrīlāta’s theory of the process of perception, I examine the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and its commentaries, the Tattvārtha and Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, and the Nyāyānusāra. I conclude that Śrīlāta’s theory of the process of perception should be expressed as, “The sense organ and the object-field are in the first moment; then perceptual consciousness arises in the second moment; after that, feelings, concepts and volitions arise in the third moment.” On the other hand, the Dārṣṭāntika and Harivarman cannot explain it as well as Śrīlāta unless they approve of mental functions. Therefore, it can be said that Śrīlāta’s idea cannot be identified with the theory of the process of perception of the Dārṣṭāntika and Harivarman.
