Dignāga denied that recollection (smṛti) as well as recognition (abhijñāna) are separate means of cognition (pramāṇāntara) in the first chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya. In this regard, however, it is questioned whether recollection is not excluded from two means of cognition consisting of perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna), or not any means of cognition. It is at least clear that recollection is not perception with the only exception that it is cognition of a recollection itself. On the other hand, recollection is similar to inference in terms of conceptual cognition.
Later commentators such as Jinendrabuddhi or Prajñākaragupta said that inference is nothing but recollection. Even if what Dignāga intended is the same as the interpretation of these commentators, it is safe to say that recollection is not a separate means of cognition. Dignāga’s concept of recollection is highly important in our inquiry into his system of epistemology, because Dignāga emphasizes recollection when arguing his theory of self-cognition (svasaṃvedana) which is one of the most significant theories in his epistemology.
