 |
|
| ヨーガ行者による過去や未来の認識について=On Yogic Cognition of Past and Future Objects | ||
| 作者 | 護山真也 (著)=Moriyama, Shinya (au.) |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | 印度學佛教學研究 =Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies=Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū |
| 卷期 | v.66 n.2 (總號=n.144) |
| 出版日期 | 2018.03.20 |
| 頁次 | 794 - 789 |
| 出版者 | 日本印度学仏教学会 |
| 出版者網址 | http://www.jaibs.jp/ |
| 出版地 | 東京, 日本 [Tokyo, Japan] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 日文=Japanese |
| 關鍵詞 | ヨーガ行者の直観; プラジュニャーカラグプタ; ジュニャーナシュリーミ トラ |
| 摘要 | The aim of this paper is to clarify the development of the Buddhist account of yogic cognition of past and future objects from Vasubandhu to Jñānaśrīmitra. In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (99.1–10), Vasubandhu introduces three opinions of the Buddha’s cognition of future results, namely, 1. inference-based understanding, 2. cognition like fortune-telling, and 3. immediate cognition in accordance with the subject’s wishes. While the first and third opinions are individually interpreted by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in TS 1852–1855, 3473–3474/TSP thereon, Prajñākaragupta unifies the two in order to show the progress of a yogin’s or the Buddha’s cognition from the inferential to the immediate cognition, in which the difference of past, present, and future is explained by “relying on other’s viewpoint” (anyāpekṣayā). On the problem of how to distinguish three times in a yogic perception that is related only to present objects, Jñānaśrīmitra, who knows well his predecessors’ arguments, finally replies by using the notion of conceptual determination (adhyavasāya), which functions in yogic perception for distinguishing past, present, and future times, though the cognition itself is ultimately undividable. |
| ISSN | 00194344 (P); 18840051 (E) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.4259/ibk.66.2_794 |
| 點閱次數 | 271 |
| 建檔日期 | 2022.08.04 |
| 更新日期 | 2022.08.04 |
建議您使用 Chrome, Firefox, Safari(Mac) 瀏覽器能獲得較好的檢索效果，IE不支援本檢索系統。
