 |
|
| Toward a Buddhist Philosophy and Practice of Human Rights | ||
| 作者 | Kelley, Christopher Donald (撰) |
|---|---|
| 出版日期 | 2015 |
| 頁次 | 192 |
| 出版者 | Columbia University |
| 出版者網址 | https://www.columbia.edu/ |
| 出版地 | New York, NY, US [紐約, 紐約州, 美國] |
| 資料類型 | 博碩士論文=Thesis and Dissertation |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 學位類別 | 博士 |
| 校院名稱 | Columbia University |
| 系所名稱 | Religion |
| 指導教授 | Thurman, Robert A. F. |
| 畢業年度 | 2015 |
| 關鍵詞 | Religion; Philosophy; Human rights; Mādhyamika (Buddhism); Bstan-ʼdzin-rgya-mtsho; Dalai Lama XIV, 1935-; Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations. General Assembly) |
| 摘要 | The 14th Dalai Lama-Tenzin Gyatso (DL) has expressed strong support for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). While this may seem to be consistent with his outspoken promotion of basic "human values" and "universal responsibility" (Piburn, 2002), there is an unresolved metaphysical conflict between his endorsement of the UDHR and concomitant ideas like "inherent dignity" and "inalienable rights," on the one hand, and, on the other, his espousal of the Buddhist "Middle Way" or "Centrist" (Madhyamaka) thesis that all phenomena (i.e., persons, things, and ideas like "human rights") lack "intrinsic existence" (svabhāva). In this dissertation I argue that an "unforced consensus" (Taylor 2011) on rights can be achieved through an application of the Madhyamaka interpretation of the "two truths" (dvasatya; bden pa gnyis). Metaphysics, however, is only one dimension of the Madhyamaka account of reality. There is an equally (if not more) important "cognitive dimension" that pertains to how one sees and interacts with the world (Westerhoff, 2009). I believe this can be effectively applied to an analysis of the psychology of human rights foundationalism (i.e., the mindset that reifies rights). The DL believes that ultimately the safeguarding of human rights culture depends on a cognitive shift at the individual level. I explore the philosophical implications of this belief, and I contend that it is consistent with the concept of human development and education in the UDHR. I conclude that Tibetan Buddhist ideas and practices can potentially help bridge the divide between human rights foundationalism and anti-foundationalism in a manner that reinvigorates the utility of the UDHR, and yet does not philosophically yield to an essentialist world-view. |
| 目次 | Introduction: Buddhism and human rights p. 1 Methodology Chapter summary Chapter 1: Reconciling the Inherent Dignity of Empty Persons p. 9 1. 1. Defining “right” 1. 2. The philosophy of human rights foundationalism 1. 3. The idea of “unforced consensus” 1. 4. No-self, emptiness, and the two truths Chapter 2: The Attraction of Human Right Foundationalism p. 35 2. 1. The false security of human rights foundationalism 2. 2. Death and disgust in the pages of LIFE magazine 2. 3. Learning from the Buddha’s existential crisis 2. 4. The “fundamentalist mindset” Chapter 3: Moral Universalism Reconsidered p. 66 3. 1. “The last refuge of repression” 3. 2. Rorty on human rights 3. 3. Positing our “shared humanity” Chapter 4: Safeguarding Rights with Empathy p. 92 4. 1. Batson’s Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis 4. 2. The spectrum of altruism in Tibetan Buddhism 4. 3. Feeling Empathy As-, For-, and With the Other 4. 4. Mirroring and Equalizing Self and Other 4. 5. Perspective-Taking and Exchanging Self and Other Chapter 6: At the Heart of a Human Rights Education p. 142 6. 1. The Human Rights Education (HRE) Movement 6. 2. HRE for Global Citizenship 6. 3. How to Fit a Global Education into a National Curriculum References p. 180 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.7916/D8S181FS |
| 點閱次數 | 870 |
| 建檔日期 | 2021.12.13 |
建議您使用 Chrome, Firefox, Safari(Mac) 瀏覽器能獲得較好的檢索效果，IE不支援本檢索系統。
