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| Buddha in the Chinese Room: Empty Persons, Other Mindstreams, and the Strong AI Debate | ||
| 作者 | Stoll, Joshua (著) |
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| 出處題名 | Hualin International Journal of Buddhist Studies |
| 卷期 | v.3 n.2 Special Issue: Buddhism and Technology, and Epigraphy |
| 出版日期 | 2020.10 |
| 頁次 | 78 - 101 |
| 出版者 | Cambria Press |
| 出版者網址 | http://www.cambriapress.com/ |
| 出版地 | New York, US [紐約州, 美國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 附註項 | Author Affiliations: University of Hawai‘i West O‘ahu |
| 關鍵詞 | Strong AI; emptiness; other minds; Buddha’s omniscience |
| 摘要 | The question of whether we can build machines that can think and feel has been with us since at least the time of Descartes. However, it has taken on a new sense of urgency and significance as our lives have become progressively more integrated with and dependent on artificially intelligent technologies. But what does ‘artificial intelligence’ mean exactly? Is it truly possible to build computers that can think and feel like us, and what would it mean if we could? This paper will explore John Searle’s famous rejection of the possibility of such ‘strong AI’ through his Chinese Room Argument and how he handles several replies to his argument. We will then discuss these replies further in the context of Buddhist considerations with respect to the emptiness of persons (pudgalanairātmya), emptiness (śūnyatā) more generally, and the status of the succession of mental states in others (santānāntara)—especially as this pertains to Buddha’s purported omniscience. Doing so will give us resources to examine the implications of Buddhist considerations for strong AI, thus giving us a sense of what a Buddhist perspective might say about the possibility of developing such technology. |
| ISSN | 25762923 (P); 25762931 (E) |
| 點閱次數 | 539 |
| 建檔日期 | 2021.03.23 |
| 更新日期 | 2021.04.29 |
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