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| Emptiness as Subject-Object Unity: Sengzhao on the Way Things Truly Are | ||
| 作者 | Ho, Chien-hsing (著)=何建興 (au.) |
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| 出處題名 | Central Division: Annual Meeting |
| 出版日期 | 2014.03 |
| 出版者 | The American Philosophical Association |
| 出版者網址 | https://www.apaonline.org/ |
| 出版地 | Chicago, IL, US [芝加哥, 伊利諾伊州, 美國] |
| 資料類型 | 會議論文=Proceeding Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 關鍵詞 | Sengzhao; Emptiness; Indetermincay; Subject-Object Unity |
| 摘要 | Sengzhao (374?−414 CE), a leading Chinese Mādhyamika philosopher, holds that the myriad things are empty, and that they are, at bottom, the same as emptiness qua the way things truly are. In this paper, I distinguish the level of the myriad things from that of the way things truly are and call them, respectively, the ontic and the ontological levels. For Sengzhao, the myriad things at the ontic level are indeterminate and empty, and he equates the way things truly are at the ontological level with emptiness. This paper explicates the ontic status of the myriad things and the ontological notion of emptiness and elucidates the relationship between them. I read Sengzhao as dismissing the idea that reality has a mind-independent structure that comprises discrete entities waiting to be captured by concepts. I show that his notion of emptiness points to a subject-object unity wherein both the subject and the myriad objects are conceptually undifferentiated. It will be seen that Sengzhao’s overall theory of emptiness is philosophically interesting in terms of its relevance for ontology and the relationship between language and reality. It provides a refreshing and challenging perspective on how we may perceive the world and understand our relationship to it. |
| 點閱次數 | 604 |
| 建檔日期 | 2020.09.10 |
| 更新日期 | 2020.09.10 |
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