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| A Critique of Epistemic Subjectivity | ||
| 作者 | Lin, Chien-te=林建德 |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Philosophia |
| 卷期 | v.44 |
| 出版日期 | 2016.05.16 |
| 頁次 | 915 - 920 |
| 出版者 | Springer |
| 出版者網址 | https://www.springer.com/gp/ |
| 出版地 | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 附註項 | Affiliations：Institute of Religion and Humanity at Tzu-Chi University, Hualien, Taiwan |
| 關鍵詞 | Science of consciousness; Subjective; Ontological; Epistemic; Axiological |
| 摘要 | John R. Searle argues that consciousness is a biological problem, and that the subjective feature of consciousness doesn't exclude the scientific study thereof. In this paper I attempt to show that Searle's identification of the subjectivity of conscious experience as being merely ontologically subjective, but not epistemically subjective is problematic, as it confuses epistemic subjectivity with axiological subjectivity. Since Searle regards the distinction between epistemic subjectivity and ontological subjectivity as an important basis for scientific studies of consciousness, the unsoundness of his argument weakens his advocacy of Biological Naturalism. |
| ISSN | 00483893 (P); 15749274 (E) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9724-9 |
| 點閱次數 | 522 |
| 建檔日期 | 2020.08.31 |
| 更新日期 | 2020.08.31 |
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