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| Jayarāśi’s Delightful Destruction of Epistemology | ||
| 作者 | Mills, Ethan |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Philosophy East and West |
| 卷期 | v.65 n.2 |
| 出版日期 | 2015.04 |
| 頁次 | 498 - 541 |
| 出版者 | University of Hawaii Press |
| 出版者網址 | https://uhpress.hawaii.edu/ |
| 出版地 | Honolulu, HI, US [檀香山, 夏威夷州, 美國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 摘要 | It is argued here that Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa (ca. 770–830 c.e .) is both a Cārvāka and a skeptic, although he is a skeptic about epistemology rather than a skeptic about the external world or a global skeptic about knowledge. After remarks on the Cārvākas and Indian skepticism, Jayarāśi’s arguments against Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are considered. Jayarāśi tries to demonstrate that in the context of epistemology, epistemology self-destructs, while in the context of everyday life there is no need for epistemology. Lastly, how Jayarāśi’s skepticism serves his Cārvāka sympathies is considered. |
| ISSN | 00318221 (P); 15291898 (E) |
| DOI | 10.1353/pew.2015.0049 |
| 點閱次數 | 753 |
| 建檔日期 | 2015.08.31 |
| 更新日期 | 2019.05.17 |
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