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| The Self as a Dynamic Constant. Rāmakaṇṭha's Middle Ground Between a Naiyāyika Eternal Self-Substance and a Buddhist Stream of Consciousness-Moments | ||
| 作者 | Watson, Alex |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Journal of Indian Philosophy |
| 卷期 | v.42 n.1 |
| 出版日期 | 2014.03 |
| 頁次 | 173 - 193 |
| 出版者 | Springer |
| 出版者網址 | http://www.springer.com/gp/ |
| 出版地 | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 附註項 | A. Watson (&) Department of South Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1 Bow Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA e-mail: alexwatson@fas.harvard.edu |
| 摘要 | The paper gives an account of Rāmakaṇṭha’s (950–1000) contribution to the Buddhist–Brāhmaṇical debate about the existence or non-existence of a self, by demonstrating how he carves out middle ground between the two protagonists in that debate. First three points of divergence between the Brāhmaṇical (specifically Naiyāyika) and the Buddhist conceptions of subjectivity are identified. These take the form of Buddhist denials of, or re-explanations of (1) the self as the unitary essence of the individual, (2) the self as the substance to which mental properties belong, (3) the self as the agent of both physical actions and cognitions. The difference of Rāmakaṇṭha’s position from both Nyāya and Buddhism is then elaborated. He posits a self, but not one that is an eternally unchanging substance, nor one that is anything other than consciousness. Hence his difference from Nyāya. He falls with Buddhism in holding that consciousness does not require anything other than itself to inhere in, but departs from Buddhism in holding that consciousness is not momentary but enduring. The guiding metaphor here is light, but light considered as a dynamic, qualitatively unchanging repetition of the action of illumination. |
| 目次 | Introduction 173 1. Nyāya Versus Buddhism 174 1.1 Self as Unitary Essence 175 1.2 Self as Substance 176 1.3 Self as Agent 178 2. Rāmakaṇṭha Against Nyāya 180 2.1 Self as Substance 180 2.2 Self as Agent of Cognition 181 3 Rāmakaṇṭha Between Nyāya and Buddhism 183 4 Rāmakaṇṭha Against Buddhism 185 4.1 Refutation of the Momentariness of Consciousness 185 4.2 The Constancy of Consciousness 186 4.3 Temporal Extension 187 4.4 Relation to Objects 188 Concluding Remarks 189 References 189 |
| ISSN | 00221791 (P); 15730395 (E) |
| 點閱次數 | 171 |
| 建檔日期 | 2014.12.31 |
| 更新日期 | 2019.08.21 |
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