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| 關於有我論與無我論的辯證=Arguments Concerning Soul and No Soul=有我論と無我論の弁証 | ||
| 作者 | 木村俊彦 (著)=Kimura, Toshihiko (au.) |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | 圓光佛學學報=Yuan Kuang Journal of Buddhist Studies |
| 卷期 | n.23 |
| 出版日期 | 2014.06 |
| 頁次 | 1 - 20 |
| 出版者 | 圓光佛學研究所=Yuan Kuang Buddhist College |
| 出版者網址 | http://www.ykbi.edu.tw/ |
| 出版地 | 桃園縣, 臺灣 [Taoyuean hsien, Taiwan] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 中文=Chinese; 日文=Japanese |
| 附註項 | 作者為日本四天王寺大學名譽教授、文博。 |
| 摘要 | Here we would like to make a sketch of arguments concerning soul (attan) and no soul (anattan) by traditional Hindu and Buddhist philosophers. In this case the former meaning should not be translated as „self‟ because the conception of self was used by later Buddhists also. As well known, in an early Buddhist canon (Vinaya) Gotama Buddha lectures that soul→health, no soul→illness; and the latter case is, of course, real. In his argumentation the principle of alternative qualities and alternative positions was not used because old Indians‟ logic was genetic. This genetic argument was typically applied in the twelve cycles‟ causality. Buddha preached a transferring logic as follows: eternality→suffering→no soul. We translated the ninth chapter of the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu partially as a typical criticism of soul arguments. We pointed out the scopes of the argumentations as for soul and no soul in the Tattvasaṅgraha, the Ślokavārttika, the Nyāyavārttika and so on. In the Appendix we introduced a case of humorous misargumentation (nigrahasthānam) concerning no soul showed by Dharmakīrti in his Vādanyāya. He revised the principle of misargumentation of the Naiyāyikas in his Vādanyāya. |
| ISSN | 16086848 (P) |
| 點閱次數 | 847 |
| 建檔日期 | 2014.08.28 |
| 更新日期 | 2017.08.16 |
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