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| The "Scent" of a Self: Buddhism and the First-Person Perspective | ||
| 作者 | Fink, Charles K. |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East |
| 卷期 | v.22 n.3 |
| 出版日期 | 2012.08 |
| 頁次 | 289 - 306 |
| 出版者 | Routledge |
| 出版者網址 | https://www.routledge.com/ |
| 出版地 | Abingdon, UK [阿賓登, 英國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 關鍵詞 | Buddhism=佛教; Phenomenology=現象學; Buddha=佛 |
| 摘要 | Buddhism famously denies the existence of the self. This is usually understood to mean that Buddhism denies the existence of a substantial self existing over and above the flow of conscious experience. But what of the purely experiential self accepted by the phenomenological tradition? Does Buddhism deny the reflexive or first-personal character of conscious experience? In this paper, I argue that even the notion of an experiential self is ultimately incompatible with Buddhist teaching—in fact, deeply incompatible. According to Buddhism, I am an objectively existing person (though not irreducibly real). However, when I conceive of myself as myself, I conceive of myself as having a subjective mode of existence. What Buddhism denies, then, is not that I exist, but that I exist in the subjective or first-person manner in which I conceive of myself as existing. The problem I take up in this paper is to understand how Buddhism can simultaneously affirm the reflexivity of conscious experience and yet deny that the experiential self is a self. |
| ISSN | 09552367 (P); 14692961 (E) |
| 點閱次數 | 270 |
| 建檔日期 | 2013.11.01 |
| 更新日期 | 2019.11.14 |
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