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| Prāsaṅgika's Semantic Nominalism: Reality is Linguistic Concept | ||
| 作者 | Thakchoe, Sonam |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Journal of Indian Philosophy |
| 卷期 | v.40 n.4 |
| 出版日期 | 2012.08 |
| 頁次 | 427 - 452 |
| 出版者 | Springer |
| 出版者網址 | http://www.springer.com/gp/ |
| 出版地 | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 附註項 | Author Affiliations: University of Tasmania, Hobart, TAS, Australia |
| 關鍵詞 | Philosophy of language; Semantic theory; Nominalism; Ontology; Universals; Unique Particulars |
| 摘要 | Buddhist semantic realists assert that reality is always non-linguistic, beyond the domain of conceptual thought. Anything that is conceptual and linguistic, they maintain, cannot be reality and therefore cannot function as reality. The Prāsaṅgika however rejects the realist theory and argues that all realities are purely linguistic—just names and concepts—and that only linguistic reality can have any causal function. This paper seeks to understand the Prāsaṅgika’s radical semantic nominalism and its philosophical justifications by comparing and contrasting it with the realistic semantic theories. |
| 目次 | Introduction 427 Realities are Linguistic Concepts 428 Nirvāṇa and Ultimate Truth are Concepts 436 Not All Linguistic Expressions (Concepts and Names) are Realities 444 Linguistic Concepts are Causally Effective 446 Conclusion 449 References 450 |
| ISSN | 00221791 (P); 15730395 (E) |
| 點閱次數 | 161 |
| 建檔日期 | 2013.10.11 |
| 更新日期 | 2019.07.31 |
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