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| Paternalist Deception in the Lotus Sūtra: A Normative Assessment | ||
| 作者 | Goodman, Charles A. (著) |
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| 出處題名 | Journal of Buddhist Ethics |
| 卷期 | v.18 |
| 出版日期 | 2011 |
| 頁次 | 1 - 30 |
| 出版者 | Department of History & Religious Studies Program , The Pennsylvania State University |
| 出版者網址 | https://history.la.psu.edu/ |
| 出版地 | University Park, PA, US |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 附註項 | Charles A. Goodman, Department of Philosophy, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 13902. |
| 摘要 | The Lotus Sūtra repeatedly asserts the moral permissibility, in certain circumstances, of deceiving others for their own benefit. The examples it uses to illustrate this view have the features of weak paternalism, but the real-world applications it endorses would today be considered strong paternalism. We can explain this puzzling feature of the text by noting that according to Mahāyāna Buddhists, normal, ordinary people are so irrational that they are relevantly similar to the insane. Kant’s determined anti-paternalism by contrast, relies on an obligation to see others as rational, which can be read in several ways. Recent work in psychology provides support for the Lotus Sūtra’s philosophical anthropology while undermining the plausibility of Kant’s version. But this result does not necessarily lead to an endorsement of political paternalism, since politicians are not qualified to wield such power. Some spiritual teachers, however, may be morally permitted to benefit their students by deceiving them. |
| ISSN | 10769005 (E) |
| 點閱次數 | 692 |
| 建檔日期 | 2011.05.05 |
| 更新日期 | 2022.04.15 |
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