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| Authority in Early Prāsagika Madhyamaka | ||
| 作者 | Vose, Kevin |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Journal of Indian Philosophy |
| 卷期 | v.38 n.6 |
| 出版日期 | 2010.12 |
| 頁次 | 553 - 582 |
| 出版者 | Springer |
| 出版者網址 | http://www.springer.com/gp/ |
| 出版地 | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 關鍵詞 | Jayānanda; Candrakīrti; Prāsa?gika; Pramā?a; Authority; Skepticism |
| 摘要 | This paper examines the role of pramā?a in Jayānanda’s commentary to Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra. As the only extant Indian commentary on any of Candrakīrti’s works (available only in Tibetan translation), written in the twelfth century when Candrakīrti’s interpretation of Madhyamaka first became widely valued, Jayānanda’s Madhyamakāvatāra?īkā is crucial to our understanding of early Prāsa?gika thought. In the portions of his text examined here, Jayānanda offers a pointed critique of both svatantra inferences and the broader Buddhist epistemological movement. In developing this critique, he cites at length Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā treatment of svatantra, and so comes to comment on the locus classicus for the Svātantrika-Prāsa?gika distinction. For Jayānanda, svatantra inferences are emblematic of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti epistemological tradition, which asserts an unwarranted validity to human cognition. As such, Nāgārjuna’s philosophy admits neither svatantra inference, nor pramā?a (as “valid cognition”) more generally. Instead, Jayānanda argues for Nāgārjuna’s “authority” (pramā?a) as our prime means for knowing reality. Jayānanda’s account of authority offers a helpful counterbalance to the current trend of portraying Prāsa?gika Madhyamaka as a form of skepticism. |
| ISSN | 00221791 (P); 15730395 (E) |
| 點閱次數 | 414 |
| 建檔日期 | 2011.04.08 |
| 更新日期 | 2019.07.29 |
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