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| Sālikanātha's Criticism of Dharmakirti's svasamvedana Theory | ||
| 作者 | Kyuma, Taiken |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Journal of Indian Philosophy |
| 卷期 | v.38 n.3 |
| 出版日期 | 2010.06 |
| 頁次 | 247 - 259 |
| 出版者 | Springer |
| 出版者網址 | http://www.springer.com/gp/ |
| 出版地 | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 關鍵詞 | Dharmakīrti; ?ālikanātha; ākāra; svasaṃvedana; tripu?ī; svayaṃprakā?a |
| 摘要 | The aim of this paper is to clarify how ?ālikanātha’s epistemology can be distinguished from that of Dharmakīrti, especially in terms of their respective views on cognitive form (ākāra). It has been pointed out that ?ālikanātha’s tripu?ī theory and svayaṃprakā?a theory are very close to Dharmakīrti’s epistemology. However, it remains questionable if ?ālikanātha, who belongs to the Prābhākara branch of the Mīmāṃsā and is therefore a nirākāravādin, can subscribe to notions that Dharmakīrti developed on the basis of sākāravāda. The present paper concludes that ?ālikanātha agrees with Dharmakīrti in assuming that a single cognition consists of three parts; unlike Dharmakīrti, however, ?ālikanātha puts emphasis on the difference between these parts, especially between the cognition and its form, on the ground that the cognitive form belongs to the external thing, and not to the cognition (nirākāravāda). In Dharmakīrti’s epistemology, the cognitive form belongs to cognition (sākāravāda); in the ultimate level, there remains no difference between the three parts. |
| 目次 | Introductory Remarks 247 S´a¯likana¯tha’s Attitude to Dharmakı¯rti’s svasam: vedana Theory 249 S´a¯likana¯tha’s Criticism of sa¯ka¯rava¯da 251 Cognitive Form in S´a¯likana¯tha’s Epistemology 254 Concluding Remarks 257 |
| ISSN | 00221791 (P); 15730395 (E) |
| 點閱次數 | 408 |
| 建檔日期 | 2011.04.07 |
| 更新日期 | 2019.07.31 |
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