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| Singular Propositions and Aristotle's Conception of Logic | ||
| 作者 | Ghose, Amitahba |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | International Philosophical Quarterly |
| 卷期 | v.15 |
| 出版日期 | 1975 |
| 頁次 | 327 - 331 |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 關鍵詞 | Logic;Proposition;Singulars;Aristotle;Ghose, Amitahba; |
| 摘要 | Abstract terms of logic like 'all' and 'some' can be understood in relation to one another purely in thought. Individual objects of which one becomes aware by sense perception are not objects of pure thought. Hence they cannot be uniquely named. Since Aristotelian and mathematical logic deals with pure thought alone there are no singular terms in either of them. The individual constants of mathematical logic are not objects of sense perception. In Nyaya and Buddhist logic singular terms are indispensable，because inference does not deal with pure thought，but with knowledge which includes both thought and sense perception. |
| ISSN | 00190365; 21538077 (E) |
| 點閱次數 | 156 |
| 建檔日期 | 2001.02.23 |
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