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| Parfit and the Buddha：Why There Are No People | ||
| 作者 | Stone, Jim |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
| 卷期 | v.48 |
| 出版日期 | 1988 |
| 頁次 | 519 - 532 |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 關鍵詞 | Metaphysics;Person;Reductionism;Stone, Jim; |
| 摘要 | This paper argues that there are no persons (in Locke's sense of the word "person"). It begins by arguing that reductionism with regard to people is incoherent. Two of Derek Parfit's arguments for reductionism are examined. The spectrum argument turns out to support an eliminativist stance as much as it supports reductionism. The fissioning argument alleges to show that identity isn't what matters in survival--but the argument begs the question and a counterargument shows that if identity isn't what matters, nothing matters. This conclusion is used to show that a consequence of reductionism is that there is nothing which can consider itself as itself in different times and places--there are no persons. Now we must choose between realism (the view that persons are ontologically extra to bodies, brains, and psychophysical events) and eliminitivism (the view that there are no persons). The paper argues that the realist ontology is both unscientific and theoretically unsatisfying (e.g.，it leads to an infinite regress, etc.). Eliminativism follows from a consistent naturalism. The Humean and Buddhist views are compared; they complement each other in diagnosing the source of the conviction that persons exist. |
| ISSN | 00318205 |
| 點閱次數 | 407 |
| 建檔日期 | 2001.01.03 |
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