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| Self-Intimation, Memory and Personal Identity | ||
| 作者 | Ganeri, Jonardon |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Journal of Indian Philosophy |
| 卷期 | v.27 n.5 |
| 出版日期 | 1999.10 |
| 頁次 | 469 - 483 |
| 出版者 | Springer |
| 出版者網址 | http://www.springer.com/gp/ |
| 出版地 | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 關鍵詞 | Memory; Metaphysics; Personal Identity; Ganeri, Jonardon |
| 摘要 | The Indian Buddhist philosopher Dinnaga defend the thesis that self-consciousness consists, not in awareness of a 'self'，but in the reflexivity of mental states. He argues from certain facts about memory，and from a theory that mental states have a 'double-aspect'--a subjective aspect and an objective aspect. I attempt a defense of his argument and compare it with neo-Lockean views about personal identity. |
| 目次 | 1. THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY OF MENTAL STATES 469 2. MEMORY 472 3. DINN_AGA’S ARGUMENT FOR SELF-INTIMATION 474 4. LOCKE ON MEMORY, SELF-INTIMATION AND PERSONAL IDENTITY 477 5. AN EVALUATION OF DINN_AGA’S ARGUMENT 481 |
| ISSN | 00221791 (P); 15730395 (E) |
| 點閱次數 | 303 |
| 建檔日期 | 2000.12.14 |
| 更新日期 | 2019.07.31 |
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