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| Refutation of the Theory of Selfhood：A Resolution of Questions About Persons | ||
| 作者 | Vasubandhu, Acharya |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Journal of Indian Philosophy |
| 卷期 | v.17 n.2 |
| 出版日期 | 1989.06 |
| 頁次 | 137 - 187 |
| 出版者 | Springer |
| 出版者網址 | http://www.springer.com/gp/ |
| 出版地 | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 關鍵詞 | Metaphysics; Selfhood; Mind; Person; Vasubandhu, Acharya |
| 目次 | 1 The Theory of Selfless Persons 137 2 The Rejection of the V6tsiputriya Theory of Persons 138 2.1 How the V6tsiputrfya Theory of Persons Differs From Ours 138 2.2 Why Persons Named and Conceived in Reliance Upon Their Aggregates Are Real Only in Name or Concept 139 2.3 Why the V~tsfputrfyas Cannot Classify Persons As Inexplicable Objects of Knowledge 142 2.4 Why, Regardless" How Named and Conceived, Persons Must Be Either the Same As Or Something Other Than Their Aggregates 143 2.5 The Vt~tslputriya Account of How Persons Are Perceived by All Six Kinds of Consciousnesses 143 2.6 How the Scriptures Establish that Persons Are the Aggregates Rather Than Inexplicable Phenomena 149 2.7 How Their Own Scriptures Contradict Their Theory of Persons 151 3. The Vdtsiputriya Objections and Our Replies and CounterOb/ections 153 3.1 How, If Persons Are Their Aggregates, a Buddha Can Be Om.iscie.t Without Knowing Everything Simultaneously 153 3.2 How, If Persons Are the Aggregates, There Can Be a Bearer of the Burden 154 3.3 How Persons that Do Not Really Exist Can Be Spontaneously Born 154 3.4 How, If Persons Are Their Aggregates, It Can Be Said in Scripture that a Person Born (for the Weal of the Many) is One 155 3.5 Why, If Persons Are Their Aggregates, the Buddha Did Not Answer the Question of Whether They Are or Are Not Something Other than Their Bodies 157 3.6 Why, Although Persons Do Not Really Exist, the Bhagav~n Declared False the Denial of Their Existence 161 3.7 How, If Persons Do Not Really Exist, Cyclic Existence Is Possible 162 3.8 Why, If Persons Really Exist, There Would Be No Buddhas 162 3.9 How Our Theory of Persons ls the Middle Way Between the Extreme Theories Propounded by the V~tsZputr[yas and the M~dhyamikas 163 4 Tirthika Objections and Our Replies and Counter-Objections 163 4.1 Why Tirthika Objections Must Be Considered 163 4.2 How, Without a Self, a Memory Can Occur 164 4.3 How the Vaiy6karanas Argue that a Person Is a Separate Agent of both Walking and Consciousness of an Object 166 4.4 How, Witkout Arising From a Self Consciousnesses of Different Ckaracter Can Arise in the Same Continuum 169 4.5 Why We Need Not Accept Their Claim that a Self ls Required as a Support of Qualities 173 4.6 How, If There Is No Self There Can Be a Person For Whose Sake an Action Is Undertaken 173 4.7 How, Without a Self as a Support, Feelings Can Have a Support 175 4.8 Why the Vai~esikas Believe that If Persons Are Not Selves, They Cannot Be Agents of Actions and Patients that Experience Their Results 175 4.9 How, Without a Self, Actions Can Produce Their Results 177 5 Concluding Verses 180 |
| ISSN | 00221791 (P); 15730395 (E) |
| 點閱次數 | 188 |
| 建檔日期 | 2001.06.20 |
| 更新日期 | 2019.07.31 |
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