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| Some Remarks on the Gunagunibhedabhanga Chapter in Udayana's Atmatattvaviveka | ||
| 作者 | Laine, Joy |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Journal of Indian Philosophy |
| 卷期 | v.21 n.3 |
| 出版日期 | 1993.09 |
| 頁次 | 261 - 294 |
| 出版者 | Springer |
| 出版者網址 | http://www.springer.com/gp/ |
| 出版地 | Berlin, Germany [柏林, 德國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 附註項 | 300 |
| 關鍵詞 | Udayanacarya, 950?-1050?; knowledge, theory of; Nyaya; Buddhism and Hinduism; philosophy, Indic; Realism; idealism |
| 摘要 | But under the requirement of philosophic consistency, and the impact of the perfectly valid reflection that experience is always my experience, and never part of some object independent of me, the world shrinks to the extension of my experience only, and I am left with bundles of my sensations. What are the natural consequences of such an epistemological sophistication? One plausible and natural reaction is what one might call the ‘Indian’ one. It runs roughly as follows: my experience of the world is, alas, only my experience. It is not ‘the real’. Moreover, the world disclosed in my experience is one of misery, precariousness, insecurity, which ends in old age and death and within which no secure, reliable, undeceptive goods can be found. The flux and precariousness which make it so unhappy a place, also make it most ill-suited to be an object of knowledge. — E. Gellner (1974: 114) |
| 目次 | I. INTRODUCTION 261 II. ON WHAT WE SEE AND TOUCH 267 III. COGNITION OF AN OBJECT AS SEPARATE FROM ITS QUALITIES 276 IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 284 |
| ISSN | 00221791 (P); 15730395 (E) |
| 點閱次數 | 205 |
| 建檔日期 | 1998.04.28 |
| 更新日期 | 2019.07.31 |
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