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| Self-Awareness without a Self: Buddhism and the Reflexivity of Awareness | ||
| 作者 | MacKenzie, Matthew |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East |
| 卷期 | v.18 n.3 |
| 出版日期 | 2008 |
| 頁次 | 245 - 266 |
| 出版者 | Routledge |
| 出版者網址 | https://www.routledge.com/ |
| 出版地 | Abingdon, UK [阿賓登, 英國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 摘要 | In this paper, I show that a robust, reflexivist account of self-awareness (such as was defended by Dignaga and Dharmakīrti, most phenomenologists, and others) is compatible with reductionist view of persons, and hence with a rejection of the existence of a substantial, separate self. My main focus is on the tension between Buddhist reflexivism and the central Buddhist doctrine of no-self. In the first section of the paper, I give a brief sketch of reflexivist accounts of self-awareness, using the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti as my example. In the next section, I examine reductionism as it relates to accounts of the self. I then, in the third section, argue that a reductionist account of persons can account for the unique features of first-person contents and our deep and multi-layered sense of self. |
| ISSN | 09552367 (P); 14692961 (E) |
| 點閱次數 | 736 |
| 建檔日期 | 2009.11.10 |
| 更新日期 | 2019.11.11 |
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