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| God and Counterpossibles | ||
| 作者 | Davis, Richard Brian |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Religious Studies |
| 卷期 | v.42 n.4 |
| 出版日期 | 2006.12 |
| 頁次 | 371 - 391 |
| 出版者 | Cambridge University Press |
| 出版者網址 | https://www.cambridge.org/ |
| 出版地 | Cambridge, UK [劍橋, 英國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 摘要 | In this paper I critically examine Brian Leftow’s attempt to construct a theistic semantics for counterpossibles, one that can be used to make sense of the fact that propositions, which exist necessarily, nevertheless depend on God as their cause. I argue that the impressive theoretical framework erected by Leftow cannot guarantee an asymmetrical dependence of propositions on God, and ultimately leads to a semantic collapse in which every counterpossible comes out false. I end by defending an alternative account of God and propositions – what I call ‘ theistic existentialism’. It is shown how this account underwrites a semantics for counterpossibles that conveniently avoids the problems attending Leftow’s theory |
| 目次 | Introduction 371 The ‘null-world’ semantics 372 Much ado about nothing 375 Counterpossible crisis 380 A way forward? 382 Two objections 386 Objection 1 386 Objection 2 387 Notes 389 |
| ISSN | 00344125 (P); 1469901X (E) |
| 點閱次數 | 188 |
| 建檔日期 | 2008.07.31 |
| 更新日期 | 2019.10.25 |
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