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Religious Experience and the Evidential Argument From Evil |
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| 作者 |
Silver, David
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| 出處題名 |
Religious Studies
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| 卷期 | v.38 n.3 |
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| 出版日期 | 2002.09 |
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| 頁次 | 339 - 353 |
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| 出版者 | Cambridge University Press |
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| 出版者網址 |
https://www.cambridge.org/
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| 出版地 | Cambridge, UK [劍橋, 英國] |
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| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
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| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
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| 摘要 | This paper examines Alvin Plantinga’s defence of theistic belief in the
light of Paul Draper’s formulation of the problem of evil. Draper argues (a) that the
facts concerning the distribution of pain and pleasure in the world are better
explained by a hypothesis which does not include the existence of God than by a
hypothesis which does; and (b) that this provides an epistemic challenge to theists.
Plantinga counters that a theist could accept (a) yet still rationally maintain a belief
in God. His defence of theism depends on the epistemic value of religious
experience. I argue, however, that Plantinga’s defence of theism is not successful. |
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| 目次 | Plantinga’s project 339
Draper’s formulation of the problem of evil 340
Plantinga’s reply to Draper’s formulation of the problem of evil 341
Epistemic defeaters and evidential challenges 343
How Plantinga’s reply is illegitimately circular 348
Concluding remarks 351
Notes 352
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| ISSN | 00344125 (P); 1469901X (E) |
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| 點閱次數 | 149 |
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| 建檔日期 | 2008.07.29 |
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| 更新日期 | 2019.10.24 |
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