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| Theological Necessity | ||
| 作者 | Schlesinger, George N. |
|---|---|
| 出處題名 | Religious Studies |
| 卷期 | v.33 n.1 |
| 出版日期 | 1997.03 |
| 頁次 | 55 - 65 |
| 出版者 | Cambridge University Press |
| 出版者網址 | https://www.cambridge.org/ |
| 出版地 | Cambridge, UK [劍橋, 英國] |
| 資料類型 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 摘要 | Anselm begins his famous ontological argument by describing God as the being greater than which none is conceivable. His description seems coherent and intelligible. Consequently a divine being thus described may be spoken of as existing in the understanding. But if so, He must actually exist as well, otherwise a being greater than Him could possibly exist, namely, one of whom the additional great-making-term ‘actual existence’ may also be predicated. The result would be a contradiction, for we would now have to concede, that contrary to our initial claim, the being harbored in our understanding is inferior to the greatest since another being who had actual existence would be greater. To avoid the contradiction we must concede actual existence to the absolutely perfect being. |
| 目次 | I. The Status of The Term ' Existence ' 55 II. ' Existence ' Is Not A Differentiating Term 56 III. Necessary Existence 56 IV. Worlds Incompatible With The Divine Scheme 59 V. One of The Most Fascinating Aspects of The Universe 61 VI. Difficulties With The Notion of Necessity 62 VII. The Ologically Possible Worlds 63 |
| ISSN | 00344125 (P); 1469901X (E) |
| 點閱次數 | 215 |
| 建檔日期 | 2008.07.08 |
| 更新日期 | 2019.10.22 |
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