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| Chih-i's Appropriation of Madhyamaka: Changing Conceptions of Truth and the Buddha's Relation to the Phenomenal World | ||
| 作者 | Mattis, Susan Elizabeth |
|---|---|
| 出版日期 | 1995.08 |
| 頁次 | 263 |
| 出版者 | Boston College |
| 出版者網址 | http://www.bc.edu/ |
| 出版地 | Boston, MA, US [波士頓, 麻薩諸塞州, 美國] |
| 資料類型 | 書籍=Book |
| 使用語言 | 英文=English |
| 關鍵詞 | Religion; Philosophy |
| 摘要 | This dissertation presents a philosophical exegesis of Chih-i's conception of the ultimate truth, through a study of Chih-i's appropriation and transformation of the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness. It is argued that through his modifications of the Madhyamaka doctrine, Chih-i's provides a theoretical foundation for important aspects of the Mahayana conception of the Buddha and establishes the basis for an innovative interpretation of the Buddha's relationship to the phenomenal realm. Prior studies of the relation between Chih-i and Madhyamaka have suggested either that their conceptions of the ultimate truth are identical or that Chih-i goes beyond the Madhyamaka coception of ultimate truth as emptiness by introducing the notion of a pure mind which transcends the duality of emptiness and provisional existence. This study establishes that Chih-i does not conceive of the ultimate truth as a transcendent pure mind, but remains that his philosophy differs significantly from the Madhyamaka in regard to the ontological status accorded to the "conventional truth". Chih-i rejects the Madhyamaka view that emptiness entails that the objects of ordinary consciousness are merely conventional constructs and affirms the real, though merely dependent, existence of phenomenal entities. He therefore views the ultimate truth as a positive reality which can be expressed as the "three truths": phenomenal entities are provisionallly existent, empty and both simultaneously, a mode of being which entails the "interpenetration" of all existents. It is argued that while both Chih-i's and Nagarjuna's conceptions of the ultimate truth account for the possibility of enlightenment within the phenomenal realm, only Chih-i's view that the truth realized by the Buddha is the "true aspect" of a "provisionally existent" phenomenal reality provides an explanation for the Buddha's compassion. Chih-i's affirmation of provisional existence also provides a theoretical basis for the hypothesis of a "Buddha nature," or determinate potential within the mind to realize the ultimate truth, and for the proposition that the Buddha retains the potential to experience evil. |
| 點閱次數 | 419 |
| 建檔日期 | 2008.04.14 |
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