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| 『集量論』第一章における〈想起〉の問題=Problems with Recollection in the First Chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya | ||
| 著者 | 吉田哲 (著)=Yoshida, Akira (au.) |
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| 掲載誌 | 印度學佛教學研究 =Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies=Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū |
| 巻号 | v.66 n.2 (總號=n.144) |
| 出版年月日 | 2018.03.20 |
| ページ | 801 - 795 |
| 出版者 | 日本印度学仏教学会 |
| 出版サイト | http://www.jaibs.jp/ |
| 出版地 | 東京, 日本 [Tokyo, Japan] |
| 資料の種類 | 期刊論文=Journal Article |
| 言語 | 日文=Japanese |
| キーワード | ディグナーガ; 『集量論』; 再認識; 想起 |
| 抄録 | Dignāga denied that recollection (smṛti) as well as recognition (abhijñāna) are separate means of cognition (pramāṇāntara) in the first chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya. In this regard, however, it is questioned whether recollection is not excluded from two means of cognition consisting of perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna), or not any means of cognition. It is at least clear that recollection is not perception with the only exception that it is cognition of a recollection itself. On the other hand, recollection is similar to inference in terms of conceptual cognition. Later commentators such as Jinendrabuddhi or Prajñākaragupta said that inference is nothing but recollection. Even if what Dignāga intended is the same as the interpretation of these commentators, it is safe to say that recollection is not a separate means of cognition. Dignāga’s concept of recollection is highly important in our inquiry into his system of epistemology, because Dignāga emphasizes recollection when arguing his theory of self-cognition (svasaṃvedana) which is one of the most significant theories in his epistemology. |
| 目次 | 1. 問題の所在 801 2. 〈再認識〉（abhijñāna）と〈想起〉（smṛti） 801 3. 疑似知覚としての〈想起知〉（smārtajñāna） 798 4. 結語 797 |
| ISSN | 00194344 (P); 18840051 (E) |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.4259/ibk.66.2_801 |
| ヒット数 | 323 |
| 作成日 | 2022.08.04 |
| 更新日期 | 2022.08.04 |
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